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Abstract 
Previous research has highlighted the wide individual variability in susceptibility to 
the false memories produced by the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure [Deese, 
J. (1959). On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in immediate 
recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 17–22; Roediger, H. L., III, & McDermott, 
K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 21, 803–814]. The current study 
investigated whether susceptibility to false memories is influenced by individual differences 
in the specificity of autobiographical memory retrieval. Memory specificity was measured 
using the Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test (SCEPT) [Raes, F., Hermans, 
D., Williams, J. M. G., & Eelen, P. (2007). A sentence completion procedure as an alternative 
to the Autobiographical Memory Test for assessing overgeneral memory in non-clinical 
populations. Memory, 15, 495-507]. Memory specificity did not correlate with correct 
recognition, but a specific retrieval style was positively correlated with levels of false 
recognition. It is proposed that the contextual details that frequently accompany false 
memories of nonstudied lures are more accessible in individuals with specific retrieval styles.  
 
Keywords: false memories; autobiographical memory specificity; individual differences 
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Individual Differences in Susceptibility to False Memories: The Effect of Memory 
Specificity 
The Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, named after studies by Deese 
(1959) and Roediger and McDermott (1995), has been widely used to investigate the creation 
of false memories under controlled laboratory conditions. In this procedure, participants 
study lists of words (e.g., bed, rest, wake, etc.) that are semantic associates of a nonstudied 
“critical lure” (e.g., sleep). When memory for the lists is then tested, participants show 
surprisingly high levels of false recall or false recognition of the critical lures. Roediger and 
McDermott found that levels of false recall exceeded the correct recall of items presented in 
the middle of the lists. In addition, the false recognition of critical lures was associated with 
high levels of confidence and the subjective experience of conscious recollection, as 
measured by “remember” responses (Tulving, 1985). The compelling nature of the DRM 
illusion has been demonstrated in many subsequent studies (see Gallo, 2010, for a review).  
A number of theoretical explanations of the DRM illusion have been proposed. 
According to activation-monitoring theory (Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001), 
critical lures are spontaneously activated in response to the items presented at study. When 
the critical lures are presented at test, participants make errors of source monitoring (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) and falsely claim that they were externally presented rather 
than internally generated. According to fuzzy-trace theory (see Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 
2008) participants encode two parallel traces of the items presented at study. Verbatim traces 
preserve contextual details of individual items whereas gist traces represent the overall theme 
of a set of items. The DRM illusion occurs because the critical lures presented at test are 
consistent with the gist of the studied items.  
One surprising finding that has to be accounted for by any theory of false memory is 
the considerable individual variability in susceptibility to the DRM illusion. For example, 
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elevated levels of false memories have been found in patients with frontal lobe damage 
(Melo, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 1999), whereas reduced levels of false memories have been 
reported in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (e.g., Budson, Daffner, Desikan, & Schacter, 
2000; Budson, Desikan, Daffner, & Schacter, 2001). Within the general population, 
susceptibility to the DRM illusion is affected by age, with reduced levels in children (e.g., 
Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002) and elevated levels in the elderly (Balota et al., 1999). An 
effect of gender has also been observed whereby women show elevated levels of false recall 
for critical lures of negative emotional valence (Dewhurst, Anderson, & Knott, 2012). 
Susceptibility to the DRM illusion has also been shown to be associated with high levels of 
dissociative experiences and vivid imagery (Winograd, Peluso, & Glover, 1998), low 
working memory capacity (Watson, Bunting, Poole, & Conway, 2005), high need-for-
cognition (Graham, 2007), and extroversion (Sanford & Fisk, 2009).  
There have also been attempts to relate the DRM procedure to memory distortions 
observed within autobiographical memory (see Gallo, 2010, for a review). Some studies have 
shown increased susceptibility to the DRM illusion in participants who claim to remember 
personal events that might be considered unlikely, such as alien abduction (Clancy, McNally, 
Schacter, Lenzenweger, & Pitman, 2002) and events from past lives (Meyersburg, Bogdan, 
Gallo, & McNally, 2009). Other studies have found that susceptibility to the DRM illusion is 
negatively associated with the recall of verifiable events. For example, Platt, Lacey, Iobst, 
and Finkelman (1998) investigated consistency of recall of a widely reported news event (the 
trial of O.J. Simpson) and found that participants who were more susceptible to the DRM 
illusion had less consistent memories of the event over time. These findings suggest that 
susceptibility to the DRM illusion is associated with inaccurate autobiographical memory 
(but see Patihis et al., 2013, who found that individuals with highly superior autobiographical 
memories are susceptible to the DRM illusion).  
Page 4 of 26
URL: http:/mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pqje
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Memory specificity and false memories 
 4
In contrast to these findings, studies comparing the DRM illusion and 
autobiographical memory distortions induced in the laboratory have found little evidence for 
an association. For example, Qin, Ogle, and Goodman (2008) found that susceptibility to the 
lost-in-the-mall technique (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995) was not associated with susceptibility to 
the DRM illusion. Other studies have compared the DRM illusion with the misinformation 
effect (see Loftus, 2005, for a review of the misinformation effect) and have produced 
conflicting results. For example, Ost et al. (2013) found no reliable relationship between the 
DRM illusion and the misinformation effect. In contrast, Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, and Dong 
(2013) used a signal detection analysis to measure sensitivity and response bias and found 
that participants who showed high sensitivity in the DRM task (as measured by d') were less 
susceptible to the misinformation effect. More recently, Calvillo and Parong (2016) 
developed a modified version of the misinformation paradigm that enabled them to compare 
discrimination and response bias measures with those produced by the DRM illusion. Despite 
these modifications, no significant relationship was observed between the DRM illusion and 
the misinformation effect.  
It is evident from the studies discussed above that the relationship between the DRM 
illusion and the accuracy of autobiographical memory is unclear. In the current study, we 
took a different approach by investigating the relationship between the DRM illusion and the 
specificity of autobiographical memory retrieval, rather than the accuracy. Specificity in this 
context refers to the retrieval of episodic details within an autobiographical memory. The 
importance of autobiographical memory specificity is illustrated by findings that reduced 
specificity, or overgeneral memory, is associated with impairments in problem solving (Raes 
et al., 2005) and increased vulnerability to mood disturbances such as depression and 
dysphoria (Anderson, Goddard, & Powell, 2010; Williams et al., 2007). Memory specificity 
has also been related to other aspects of memory functioning. For example, Raes et al. (2006) 
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investigated the relationship between specificity and a range of laboratory-based memory 
measures, including working memory, verbal memory, and source memory, in patients with 
major depressive disorder. They found that overgeneral memory was related to impairments 
in working memory (particularly executive functioning) and source memory. These findings 
are particularly relevant to the current study because susceptibility to the DRM illusion has 
been shown to be associated with executive functions (Watson et al., 2005) and source 
monitoring (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). 
Autobiographical memory specificity has been investigated using the 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) developed by Williams and Broadbent (1986), in 
which participants are instructed to retrieve specific autobiographical memories in response 
to cue words. According to Raes, Hermans, Williams, and Eelen (2007), however, the AMT 
is not sufficiently sensitive to measure memory specificity in non-clinical respondents. 
Compared to clinical groups, the proportion of non-clinical respondents who exhibit an 
overgeneral retrieval style in the AMT is relatively small. In addition, such respondents can 
override their habitual retrieval style and retrieve specific memories when instructed to do so. 
Raes et al. (2007) developed an alternative method for measuring habitual retrieval style 
based on a sentence completion task. In the Sentence Completion for Events from the Past 
Test (SCEPT) participants are provided with 11 sentence stems relating to the past (e.g., Last 
week I…). They are free to complete the stems however they wish, as long as each sentence 
relates to a different topic. The main advantage of the SCEPT is that it provides a measure of 
a participant’s habitual retrieval style by removing the instruction to retrieve only specific 
memories.  
In the current study, participants took part in both the SCEPT and the DRM procedure 
and our aim was to investigate whether performance on the two tasks was associated. 
Intuitively, one might expect individuals with less specific retrieval styles to be more 
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susceptible to the DRM illusion, as they may be less able to recall the contextual details that 
are typically associated with studied items. Research has shown that false memories can be 
reduced by a “recollection rejection” strategy whereby participants reject lures by 
recollecting the related studied items (Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003). It is 
possible that such strategies are impaired in individuals with less specific retrieval styles. If 
so, we would expect participants with high specificity to show increased correct recognition 
and reduced false recognition relative to those with low specificity. On the other hand, a 
common finding in DRM studies is that critical lures are accompanied by the illusory 
recollection of contextual details (e.g., Lampinen, Neuschatz, & Payne, 1999, Lyle & 
Johnson, 2006). It is possible that participants with specific retrieval styles will be more 
inclined to accept an item in a recognition test as “old” if their memory for the item features 
such contextual details. If this is the case, then participants with specific retrieval styles might 
be more susceptible to false memories. In order to investigate the relationship between 
memory specificity and recollection and shed light on these contradictory theoretical 
predictions, we incorporated a “remember/know” decision into the recognition test (see 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995, Experiment 2).  
We also manipulated list type within the DRM procedure by presenting participants 
with words that were associates either of negatively valenced or of neutral critical lures. One 
of the criticisms of the DRM procedure is that it lacks the emotionality of false memories that 
occur in real-life scenarios (see Freyd & Gleaves, 1996). This is particularly relevant to the 
current study as reduced memory specificity has been interpreted as a response to negative 
life events (Williams et al., 2007). On this basis, it could be predicted that memory specificity 
will be associated with false memories for negative items but not neutral items. Previous 
research has shown that a DRM effect can be observed when list items are associates of 
emotional critical lures, though the direction of the effect varies between studies. Some 
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studies have shown that emotional DRM lists produce lower levels of false memory than 
neutral lists (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2004, Palmer & Dodson, 2009, Pesta, Murphy, & 
Sanders, 2001), whereas others have shown that emotional lists lead to higher levels of false 
memory (e.g., Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008, Dewhurst et al., 2012, El 
Sharkawy, Groth, Vetter, Beraldi, & Fast, 2008). These differences are likely due to the use 
of different lists (see Dewhurst et al. for further discussion of this). The manner in which 
memory is tested also appears to be crucial. For example, Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, 
and Wimmer (2010) found that negative DRM lists produced higher levels of false 
recognition relative to neutral lists but lower levels of false recall. These differences 
notwithstanding, the use of emotional and neutral lists in the current study allowed us to 
investigate whether the relationship between memory specificity and susceptibility to false 
memories is influenced by the valence of the word lists. Establishing the effects of valence 
will also have important implications for the selection of stimuli in future false memory 
studies. 
Method 
Participants.  
Eighty-five undergraduate students (67 females) in the age range 18-31 participated 
for payment or course credit. All were native English speakers. They were tested at 
individual workstations in groups of up to six.  
Stimuli and Design.  
The SCEPT (Raes et al., 2007) requires participants to complete 11 sentence stems 
relating to the past (e.g., Last week I…). Participants are free to complete the stems however 
they wish provided each completion relates to a different topic. In the procedure developed 
by Raes et al., sentence completions are coded into four categories: specific memory (with 
reference to a particular place and time, and not lasting more than 1 day), categoric (reference 
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to a category of events containing a number of episodes), extended (reference to a single 
event lasting longer than 1 day), or a semantic associate (personal semantic information). 
Any failures to complete a stem are recorded as omissions. As we were interested in the 
effects of memory specificity on false memory, responses were simply coded into specific 
versus non-specific.  
 True and false recognition were measured using 10 negatively-valenced and 10 
emotionally neutral DRM lists developed by Dewhurst et al. (2012). Each list consisted of 12 
semantic associates of a critical lure. The negative lists consisted of associates of the 
following critical lures: sick, lie, anger, fear, evil, cry, pain, hate, alone, danger. The neutral 
lists consisted of associates of the following critical lures: sleep, chair, foot, high, rough, 
king, fruit, sweet, mountain, slow. Half the participants studied the lists in the order shown 
above with negative and neutral lists alternating. This order was reversed for the remaining 
participants. The negative and neutral lists were matched for backwards associative strength. 
Dewhurst et al. reported independent samples t-tests showing that the negative lists and 
critical lures were of significantly lower valence than the neutral lists. The full set of lists and 
their psycholinguistic properties can be found in Stimuli section of Dewhurst et al.   
Procedure 
The DRM lists were presented on Apple Macintosh computers using custom-written 
software. Each list was preceded by the instruction List 1, List 2, etc., which was shown for 2 
seconds, after which the 12 associates appeared one at a time for 1 second each, separated by 
a 1 second interval. After the presentation of the final list, participants were given a 
nonverbal filler task (maths problems) for 5 minutes. This was followed by a recognition test 
consisting of 40 studied items (two from each list), 20 critical lures, and an additional 40 
unstudied words (20 neutral and 20 negative) not related to the DRM lists. Test items were 
presented one a time and participants pressed the z and / keys to indicate “old” and “new" 
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respectively. Old responses were followed by an instruction inviting participants to make the 
remember/know/guess decision by pressing the R, K, or G key. Participants were instructed 
to make a “remember” response if they could recollect some contextual detail of seeing the 
word at study, such as an image or association formed at study, or a “know” response if they 
recognised the word on the basis of familiarity but had no recollection of contextual 
information. They were instructed to make a “guess” response if their old/new decision had 
been a guess.  
After completing the recognition test, participants were introduced to the SCEPT. 
They were instructed to complete each stem any way they wished, with the only constraints 
being that each completion had to relate to a different topic and to correspond to the provided 
stem. Participants were allowed 6 minutes to complete the SCEPT. There were no failures to 
complete within this time.  
Results 
 As we were interested in the relationship between specificity and memory 
performance, responses on the SCEPT were categorised as specific or non-specific. 
Responses from all participants were coded by the second author and responses from a 
random sample of ten participants were second coded by the first author. Inter-rater reliability 
was good (Cohen’s Kappa = .96). The few discrepancies that occurred were resolved by 
discussion.  
Preliminary analyses consisted of separate 2 (list type: negative versus neutral) x 2 
(response type: remember versus know) repeated measures ANOVAs on correct and false 
recognition proportions. Guess responses were not included in the analyses as they were 
made below chance levels. The analysis of correct recognition showed a significant main 
effect of list type, whereby participants correctly recognized more words from neutral lists 
than from negative lists, F (1,84) = 25.99, MSE = .01, p < .001, p
2
 = .24. A significant main η
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effect of response type was also observed, whereby participants made more correct remember 
responses than correct know responses, F (1,84) = 235.58, MSE = .07, p < .001, p
2
 = .74. 
The interaction between list type and response type was also significant, F (1,84) = 47.91, 
MSE = .02, p < .001, p
2
 = .36. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons showed that the 
advantage for negative words was present in both remember responses, p < .001, and know 
responses, p < .001, but Table 1 indicates that the difference was greater in remember 
responses.  
In the analysis of false recognition, the main effect of list type was not significant, F 
(1,84) = 2.61, MSE = .01, p = .11, p
2
 = .03, nor was the main effect of response type, F < 1. 
There was, however, a significant interaction between list type and response type, F (1,84) = 
17.99, MSE = .02, p < .001, p
2
 = .18. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons showed that 
participants made more false remember responses to neutral lures than to negative lures, p = 
.006, but more false know responses to negative lures than to neutral lures, p < .001.  
 Our primary interest, however, was in the relationship between autobiographical 
memory specificity and the levels of correct and false recognition for negative and neutral 
lists. This relationship was analysed in a series of correlations, with separate analyses of 
remember responses, know responses, and total recognition scores (remember plus know). 
Table 2 shows the correlations between the numbers of specific memories reported and 
correct recognition scores for negative and neutral lists. As can be seen from Table 2, no 
significant correlations with memory specificity were observed for total recognition scores, 
remember responses, or know responses. Table 3 shows the correlations between the 
numbers of specific memories reported and false recognition scores for negative and neutral 
lists. As can be seen, memory specificity showed significant positive correlations with overall 
recognition scores and false remember responses for negative and neutral lures. No 
significant correlations were observed for false know responses.  
η
η
η
η
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 We also conducted signal detection analyses to investigate whether memory 
specificity was related to measures of sensitivity and response bias. In order to avoid 
proportions of 0 and 1 in the signal detection analyses, we used the correction recommended 
by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) whereby 0.5 was added to the hit and false alarm rates, 
which were then divided by the maximum possible score +1.  Table 4 shows the correlations 
between the number of specific memories and measures of sensitivity (d') and response bias 
(C) for negative and neutral lists. As can be seen from Table 4, there were no significant 
correlations between memory specificity and d' for negative or neutral lists in terms of total 
recognition scores, remember responses, or know responses. In contrast, significant 
correlations were observed between memory specificity and response bias in the total 
recognition scores for both negative and neutral lists. The correlation was also significant for 
remember responses to neutral lists.  
Discussion 
 The main finding from the current study is that autobiographical memory specificity, 
as measured by the SCEPT (Raes et al., 2007), was positively correlated with susceptibility to 
the DRM illusion. A specific retrieval style was associated with higher false recognition rates 
for critical lures, both in terms of overall false alarm rates and in terms of false remember 
responses. We speculated that the effects of memory specificity might be confined to 
negative lists, based on the view that reduced memory specificity developed in response to 
negative life events (Williams et al., 2007). The effect of memory specificity was, however, 
present for both negative and neutral DRM lists, indicating that the effect of memory 
specificity is not confined to words of one particular valence. In contrast to the effects in false 
recognition, autobiographical memory specificity was not significantly associated with levels 
of correct recognition. This pattern suggests that participants with a specific retrieval style are 
more likely to endorse a new item as old if it is related to items presented at study. This is 
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supported by the signal detection analyses showing that high memory specificity was 
associated with a more liberal response bias.  
The finding that high memory specificity was associated with greater susceptibility to 
the DRM illusion could be considered counterintuitive, as one might expect individuals with 
specific retrieval styles to be more accurate. We speculated that participants with high 
memory specificity might be more successful in rejecting critical lures because of their 
superior recognition of studied items. If this was the case, memory specificity would have 
been associated with increased correct recognition and reduced false recognition. However, 
there were no significant correlations between specificity group and correct recognition, and 
the effects in false recognition were in the opposite direction. The observed pattern is more 
consistent with the view that participants with specific retrieval styles are more inclined to 
accept a test item as “old” if their recollection of the item features specific details. In short, 
they associate detail with veridicality. This is consistent with previous findings that false 
memories in the DRM paradigm often feature illusory contextual details (see Lyle & 
Johnson, 2006, for a review). The finding that the effect of memory specificity was located in 
false “remember” responses also supports this interpretation. 
In terms of activation-monitoring theory (Roediger et al., 2001), the current findings 
could be attributed to source monitoring errors in participants with specific retrieval styles. 
This appears to be at odds with the findings of Raes et al. (2006) that source monitoring 
errors were associated with reduced memory specificity. However, in the task used by Raes 
et al., participants studied two lists of words and were then given a recognition test in which 
they had to identify the source of each target (List A or List B). This is notably different from 
the DRM procedure used in the current study, in which participants have to indicate whether 
an item is old or new. It is easy to see how participants with less specific retrieval styles 
would find it difficult to distinguish between two similar sources, as they would be less able 
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to retrieve source-specific detail. In the DRM procedure, however, participants with a 
specific retrieval style might be more likely to create false memories that feature episodic 
details. Previous DRM studies have shown that contextual details from studied items can be 
erroneously bound to critical lures, giving rise to false memories that feature details of the 
encoding context (Lampinen et al., 1999; Lyle & Johnson, 2006). The current findings have 
clear implications for activation-monitoring theory as they suggest that such details are more 
accessible in participants with a specific retrieval style.   
The view that a specific retrieval style increases susceptibility to source monitoring 
errors is also supported by findings from the visual memory literature. For example, Johnson, 
Raye, Wang, and Taylor (1979) reported that participants who were rated as “good imagers” 
were more prone to source monitoring errors. Participants in this study were presented with 
pictures either two, five or eight times and also had to generate images of the pictures two, 
five or eight times. Johnson et al. found that good imagers (as determined by performance on 
a picture imagery test) overestimated the number of times each picture was presented. This 
finding suggests that the tendency to generate sensory detail impairs the ability to distinguish 
between studied and self-generated events. An interesting direction for future research would 
be to investigate the effects of retrieval style on source monitoring. 
At first glance, the current findings appear to be at odds with fuzzy-trace theory, 
which attributes the DRM illusion to gist traces. Gist traces lack the specificity of verbatim 
traces, therefore it could be argued that fuzzy-trace theory predicts that false memories would 
be more prevalent in participants with less specific retrieval styles. However, fuzzy-trace 
theory acknowledges the possibility of “phantom recollection”, whereby participants have the 
conscious experience of recollecting a nonstudied item (Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & 
Mojardin, 2001). Brainerd et al. observed phantom recollection in false recognition using 
both DRM lists and lists of category exemplars from which some typical items were removed 
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to provide critical lures. More recently, Marche and Brainerd (2012) found phantom 
recollection in false recall using DRM lists. They argued that phantom recollection occurs 
when gist traces are sufficiently strong that they take on phenomenological detail. Fuzzy-
trace theory can explain the current findings if one assumes that the tendency to derive 
phantom recollection from strong gist traces is enhanced in participants with specific retrieval 
styles.  
Although not the main focus of the current study, it is important to note that the 
effects of word type were consistent with those reported by Dewhurst et al. (2012) who used 
the same word lists. Specifically, Dewhurst et al. found higher levels of correct and false 
recall for neutral than for negatively valenced lists (though the latter was only present in 
female participants). In the current study, we found higher levels of correct and false 
remember responses for neutral than for emotional lists. Although these patterns were not 
observed in overall recognition scores due to reversed effects in know responses, they are 
consistent with previous findings that effects selectively observed in remember responses 
often follow the same pattern as effects observed in free recall (e.g., Dewhurst, Hitch, & 
Barry, 1998).  
 To summarise, the main finding from the current study is that autobiographical 
memory specificity was positively associated with susceptibility to the DRM illusion. False 
memories produced by the DRM procedure typically feature illusory contextual details (see 
Lyle & Johnson, 2006, for a review). The current findings suggest that participants with a 
specific retrieval style are more likely to falsely recollect such details. Previous research has 
highlighted the benefits of having a specific retrieval style. For example, it has been shown to 
be a protective factor against mood disturbances such as depression and dysphoria (Anderson 
et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2007). The current findings suggest a possible negative 
consequence of having a specific retrieval style, albeit within the context of a memory 
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illusion that is driven by relatively simple verbal associations. An interesting direction for 
future research would be to investigate the effects of retrieval style on susceptibility to more 
naturalistic false memory paradigms, such as the misinformation effect and the imagination 
inflation paradigm. In the meantime, our results add to the growing body of evidence that the 
retrieval of episodic detail is no guarantee of the veridicality of a memory. 
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Table 1 
Mean proportions (with standard deviations) of hits and false alarms as a function of list type 
and response type. 
 
     Emotional   Neutral   
Hits (R+K)    .73 (.15)  .80 (.13)   
Hits (R)    .52 (.19)  .68 (.16)   
Hits (K)     .21 (.12)  .13 (.08)   
False alarms (R+K)   .48 (.26)  .47 (.23)   
False alarms (R)   .22 (.22)  .27 (.19)   
False alarms (K)   .27 (.18)  .19 (.13)  
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Table 2 
Mean correlations with number of specific memories for correct recognition of negative and 
neutral lists.  
 
     Pearson’s r   p-value 
Negative (R+K)   .117   .076   
Negative (R)    -.002   .985   
Negative (K)     .131   .233  
Neutral (R+K)   .172   .116   
Neutral (R)    .121   .268   
Neutral (K)     .019    .860  
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Table 3 
Mean correlations with number of specific memories for false recognition of negative and 
neutral critical lures.  
 
     Pearson’s r   p-value 
Negative (R+K)   .236   .030   
Negative (R)    .214   .049   
Negative (K)     .096   .381  
Neutral (R+K)   .285   .008   
Neutral (R)    .233   .032   
Neutral (K)     .158    .148  
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Table 4 
Mean correlations with number of specific memories for sensitivity (d') and response bias (C) 
for negative and neutral lists.  
 
      Pearson’s r   p-value 
Negative (R+K)  d'  -.140   .202   
    C  -.255   .018 
Negative (R)   d'  -.186   .088   
    C  -.160   .143 
Negative (K)    d'  .042   .703   
    C  -.177   .105 
Neutral (R+K)  d'  -.121   .269   
    C  -.301   .005 
Neutral (R)   d'  -.096   .381   
    C  -.219   .044  
Neutral (K)    d'  -.114   .298   
    C  -.133   .225  
 
 
 
Page 26 of 26
URL: http:/mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pqje
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
